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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

T

his analysis provides an overview of
federal pediatric drug safety policy. It also
assesses the economic effectiveness of one
aspect of this policy, known as “pediatric exclusivity.”

Equity Act of 2003 (PREA) empowers the FDA
to require pediatric drug studies under certain
conditions. Both laws contain “sunset” provisions and are set to expire in October 2007.

The safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals
for children is a fundamental aspect of overall
pediatric health policy. Moreover, the growing
focus on patient safety and medical error reduction, as well as evidence of growing insurer
resistance to coverage of off-label prescribing
(which is the most common means by which
physicians prescribe drugs to children), have
combined to make pediatric drug safety a matter of mounting policy importance. Indeed, twothirds of all drugs prescribed for children have
not been tested and labeled for pediatric use.

BPCA has helped contribute to expanded drug
testing, which in turn has led to labeling improvements. Better labeling might reasonably
be expected to lead to more appropriate prescribing in accordance with clinical guidelines,
which in turn would promote greater patient
compliance. As compliance improves, health
care costs are affected. Asthma, for example,
is a pediatric condition in which noncompliance with clinical guidelines greatly contributes to significant and unnecessary pediatric
hospitalization rates. To predict potential savings resulting from better compliance through
improved labeling, this analysis: calculated the
cost of hospitalizations resulting from adverse
drug reactions, obtained aggregate estimates
of direct medical costs other than hospitalizations, and considered indirect costs arising
from childhood asthma. Based on 2002 data
trended forward to 2005 dollars, we estimate

Current federal policy provides a “carrot and
stick” approach to pediatric drug safety. The
Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA)
encourages drug companies to voluntarily test
drugs for pediatric safety in response to an
FDA request, by granting a six-month period of
market exclusivity. The Pediatric Research
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that increased compliance would result in a
$96 million reduction in hospitalization costs,
a $107 million reduction in non-hospital costs,
a $16 million reduction in the loss of caregiver
productivity and $5.29 million in savings related to adverse drug reactions (ADR). In total,
we estimate that for asthma alone, the potential cost savings associated with improved pediatric labeling could reach some $225 million
annually.
Our analysis suggests the beneficial effects
of a robust pediatric testing policy that relies
in part on reasonable incentives, as well as
on additional safeguards aimed at ensuring
that necessary testing in fact happens. This
analysis underscores the patient and societal
benefits of testing. As a result, we recommend
strengthening BPCA to include a provision that
would ensure that where a testing request
is declined, manufacturers furnish clear and
convincing evidence of net financial losses
associated with testing in relation to the incentives promised.
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INTRODUCTION
This policy analysis examines the effectiveness of pediatric exclusivity, one of the policy
approaches the federal government uses to
promote drug safety for children. Federal policy
in this area is highly complex, and provisions

related to pediatric drug safety, including pediatric exclusivity, are set to expire in 2007.
Following a policy overview, this analysis summarizes the impact of pediatric exclusivity and
reports on the results of our effort to shed light

on the economic value of pediatric exclusivity.
The analysis concludes with a discussion of options for further promoting a safe environment
for drug use in children.

BACKGROUND
Pediatric drug testing as a health care and public health policy imperative
The safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals for

tion (Meadows 2003, 12-17). One hospital-

scribing, which represents the principal means

children is of fundamental importance to sound,
national pediatric health policy. In the modern
health care system, pharmaceuticals play a
prominent role in health care, and the appropriate use of prescription drug therapies can
dramatically affect the course, quality, and outcome of patient treatment. Furthermore, drug
safety protections are essential to lowering the
risk of adverse outcomes.

based study conducted from January through
June 2004 found that 31% of drugs used were
prescribed off-label in relation to either indication or age. The majority of indication-related
off-label uses involved gastrointestinal and respiratory disorders, while off-label uses related
to age mainly involved asthma medications
and anti-convulsants (Eiland et al. 2006, 10621065). A more comprehensive study of pediatric off-label use in hospitals found that almost
80% of children receive off-label medications
(Shah et al. 2007, 282-290). Indeed, off-label
use in children is so pervasive that the practice
is considered a “cornerstone of pediatric medical therapeutics” (Budetti 2003, 950-951).

by which drugs are used in children given the
absence of a robust testing policy. Indeed, the
potential for cost containment reforms to implicate the primary means by which drugs are
prescribed for children is not speculative. While
the extent of insurer coverage practices where
off-label use is concerned is not known, one
state already has enacted Medicaid reforms
that, until subsequently modified, would have
denied coverage for virtually all off-label drug
use by limiting coverage to pharmaceuticals
shown to be safe and effective for a specific
indication (Schneider 2004).

Yet drug safety protections for children are significantly less than optimal. The United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reported that approximately two-thirds
of all drugs prescribed for children have not
been tested and labeled for pediatric use (GAO
2007), and this figure is supported by earlier
research (Budetti 2003, 950-951). Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) data suggest that
only 20% to 30% of drugs granted marketing
approval have an approved pediatric indica-

The need for a comprehensive approach to ensuring pediatric drug testing and labeling has
taken on added importance in recent years, as
third party payer cost containment efforts have
come to focus increasingly on off-label pre-

In sum, the absence of a sufficient pediatric
drug testing policy threatens not only to reduce
quality and safety but also to “leave children
behind” (Iyasu et al. 2007, 497-508) where
advances in prescription drug therapy are concerned, to the extent that insurers begin to deny
coverage for off-label therapies.

The early policy framework for pediatric drug safety
Government possesses the inherent power to
protect patients from poor quality or unsafe
health conditions, including the use of inadequately tested drugs in children (Gostin 2003).
Although federal law gives the government the
authority to require drug testing in children,
these regulatory powers have been exercised
but only to a limited degree and not in the case
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of prescribed drugs already on the market.
Increasingly, the federal government has adopted an incentivization approach to promoting
pediatric drug safety.

enacted in 1962 added the dimension of “efficacy” to FDA review, but the legislation neither
required nor encouraged pediatric studies as
a specific aim.

Prior to 1962, federal drug regulatory policy
required consideration only of the safety of a
drug proposed for market entry. Legislation

Regulations promulgated in 1979 by the FDA
sought to improve standards by requiring that
pediatric labeling claims be supported by ad-

Funding for this analysis comes from the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation and the American Academy of Pediatrics.

2

equate pediatric test data, but these requirements did little to alter the status quo, as the
agency continued to permit the approval of adult
drugs untested in children, so long as labeling
(known as “orphaning clauses”) disclosed the
lack of pediatric testing. Boilerplate language
such as “Safety and efficacy in pediatric patients have not been established” became the
norm. Indeed, the 1979 rule appeared to impede rather than spur pediatric drug research,
since prescription drug manufacturers concluded that disclosure was a more efficient approach than testing (Breslow 2003, 133). As a
result, pediatric testing remained dormant.

However, the rise of HIV/AIDS as a pediatric
disease sparked a new sense of urgency regarding the need for a national pediatric drug
testing policy (Lynch 2007, 79 and Milne 1999).
In 1990, the FDA announced a new policy of
incorporating a “Pediatric Page” into its review
process for all new molecular entities submitted for approval. This change in policy required
manufacturers to provide detailed information
regarding pediatric use, so that the agency
could assess the adequacy of a prescription
drug label in a child health context. Manufacturers were also required to disclose any need,
plans, or agreements with the FDA that were
related to further studies in children. In prac-

tice, this regulatory scheme tended to simply
summarize the state of pediatric studies as
part of the FDA drug review process (Lynch
2007, FN 78).

complimented the BPCA by requiring companies to study certain drugs for use in children.
The BPCA provides a “carrot” for more extensive pediatric drug testing through the use of
financial incentives, along with the vesting of
total discretion in pharmaceutical companies
to determine when incentives are sufficiently
beneficial to justify testing. In the case of onpatent drugs, the BPCA carrot consists of an
additional period of protection from market
competition (for example, the market entry of a
generic competitor) when a manufacturer of an
on-patent drug conducts certain pediatric studies in response to an FDA request.

The PREA provides a “stick.” The statute expressly empowers the FDA to require pediatric
drug studies where the pediatric indication is
the same as the adult indication and the agency has determined that certain criteria are met
to require pediatric testing. Because PREA
emphasizes a more regulatory approach, it applies regardless of whether a drug or biologic
product is on-patent or off-patent.

The FDA sought to refine its pediatric policy
in 1994 by specifying conditions under which
manufacturers could use adult studies, in addition to other specific and relevant data, in
order to support pediatric labeling; however,
the new policy did not actually require any new
testing. Drug manufacturers could continue to
opt for simple disclosure through a disclaimer
approach if the necessary information was absent.

A decade of legislative reform
The 1997 enactment of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act represented
a major advance in national policy related to
promoting the safety and quality of pharmaceuticals for children. Included in the legislation
was a provision – that has come to be known
as “pediatric exclusivity” – whose purpose was
to encourage pediatric clinical drug trials by
providing an incentive to pharmaceutical companies. The pediatric exclusivity law was reauthorized in 2002 as the Best Pharmaceuticals
for Children Act (BPCA). This reauthorization
was followed in 2003 by the enactment of the
Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA), which

Both laws contain “sunset” provisions and unless they are reauthorized, will expire in October 2007.

The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act
Pediatric exclusivity offers a simple and
straight-forward incentive: in exchange for
conducting pediatric trials specifically requested by the FDA, drug manufacturers of
on-patent drugs – or those applying for approval of new drugs that will receive patent
protection if approved – can obtain a sixmonth extension of market exclusivity for all
of their products with the same active ingredient as the drug under study. During this sixmonth extension period, the FDA cannot grant
marketing approval applications for a generic
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version of the drug where the application for
marketing approval relies on the safety and
efficacy data from the originator’s marketing
application. Thus pediatric exclusivity has the
effect of delaying generic competition.
The process, as detailed in the BPCA itself,
is as follows: In cases in which the Secretary determines that “information relating to
the use of a new drug in the pediatric population may produce health benefits for that
population,” the FDA then makes a written

request to a manufacturer asking that it conduct specific pediatric studies within a certain
timeframe, the age groups to be tested, and
the study design and goals. These studies
are then completed and submitted as part
of a new drug application or supplement
thereto for the new pediatric indication of an
already-marketed drug. The Secretary then
has 90 days to review the application and
determine whether the submission meets the
study requirements and, if so, exclusivity is
granted; thus, the six-month extension is not

Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in scattered sections of 21 USC).
Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37, 434 (June 26, 1979) (codified as amended
in 21 C.F.R. pt. 201 and 202).
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contingent upon an actual labeling change,
but instead, on provision by a company of
data in response to the agency’s request. If
a new indication or other labeling change is
warranted, the FDA and the drug company
then negotiate these changes. But because
the program is voluntary, a company that receives an FDA request to conduct a pediatric
trial can choose whether or not to participate.
There appears to be no evidence regarding
the reasons underlying a decline; presumably
factors such as the cost of the study in relation to the economic benefit to the firm, or the
company’s own judgment regarding the need
for further study would affect a manufacturer’s determination (Li et al. 2007).
The pediatric exclusivity provision was set to
expire in 2002 but was reauthorized that year
as the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act.
Reauthorization followed in the wake of evidence regarding the law’s success in spurring
pediatric testing and labeling changes (Li et
al. 2007 and Lynch 2007, 94), as well as evidence regarding a need for further reforms.
Specifically, an FDA report to Congress in
2001 found that the exclusivity provision resulted in new studies and “has been highly
effective in generating pediatric studies on
many drugs and in providing useful new information in product labeling” (FDA 2001, i).
The FDA also noted that the incentive “naturally tended to produce pediatric studies on
those products where the exclusivity has the
greatest value,” and noted that the incentive
was not adequate for old antibiotics and other
drugs lacking patent protections or for certain
younger age groups, especially neonates
(FDA 2001, iii).
The 2002 law reauthorized the pediatric exclusivity provision for five years and added
several significant improvements, including
mechanisms to conduct both studies of on-

patent drugs for which a manufacturer declined a written request and for older off-patent drugs, a shorter timeline for determining
labeling changes, and a provision to disseminate important study and labeling information
to the public; but did not fundamentally alter
the actual 1997 legislation regarding pediatric exclusivity.
To address the gap in pediatric drug trials
involving off-patent drugs, the 2002 amendments created a “Program for Pediatric Studies” which established a protocol for testing
off-patent drugs. Under this protocol, the FDA
and the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
are required to develop an annual list of offpatent/off-exclusivity drugs that the agencies
believe need to be studied in order to assess safety and efficacy in children. The FDA
selects an off-patent drug from the list and
sends a request for pediatric studies to all
manufacturers that have registered versions
of the drug. If none respond to this request
within 30 days, the FDA is then authorized
to publish a request for proposals and to
contract with organizations such as universities, teaching hospitals, contract research
organizations, laboratories, etc. to conduct
the relevant trials. As of December 2005, the
FDA had sent sixteen requests for pediatric
studies of off-patent drugs to manufacturers
under this provision. Fifteen were declined by
the manufacturer(s). Of the fifteen declined
studies, the NIH has funded seven, spending
an estimated $52.5 million. One of the reasons the NIH has not pursued more studies
of off-patent drugs is a lack of funding. The
NIH does not receive a specific appropriation
for pediatric drug trials, rather it utilizes ‘lump
sum appropriations’ received by other insti-

BPCA amendments allow the FDA to refer the
drug to a quasi-governmental “Foundation for
the National Institutes of Health” (also called
the Foundation for Pediatric Research), a
private, non-governmental foundation to
facilitate the pediatric trials. This Foundation is designated under the law to address
concerns that, in the event public funding is
unavailable to conduct the test, independent
funding can be secured for this purpose. The
Foundation is empowered to collect funds
through gifts, donations, and grants, and to
then award grants for pediatric drug research
of on-patent drugs to outside groups. If the
Foundation itself is unable to secure sufficient funds to conduct the study, the FDA can
then include the drug on the list of drugs for
the Program for Pediatric Studies described
above. As of December 2005, the FNIH collected $4.13 million for pediatric drug studies.
This amount was insufficient to conduct a full
clinical study but is being used to supplement
the cost of a clinical trial on baclofen, an onpatent drug whose manufacturer declined a
written request (GAO 2007).
Additional changes made by the 2002 reforms are aimed at achieving greater specificity regarding when the FDA can make a
request for pediatric trials, establishing a
process for resolving disputes over labeling
changes, and assuring public disclosure of
the results of all studies conducted under this
law through publication on FDA’s website. All
of these provisions taken together provide the
“carrot” to induce more pediatric research.

tutes (GAO 2007).
For on-patent drugs, if a manufacturer declines to perform a pediatric study, the 2002
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Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs; Revision of “Pediatric Use” Subsection in the Labeling, 59 Fed. Reg. 64, 240
(Dec. 13, 1994) (codified as amended in 21 C.F.R. pt. 201).
5 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, P.L. 105-115 (105th Cong., 1st Sess.) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.)
6 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, P.L. 105-115 (105th Cong., 1st Sess.) amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505A, 21
U.S.C. § 355a (b-c) (West Supp. 2006).
7 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002).
8 Pediatric Research Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
9 21 U.S.C. § 355a (b), (c) (West Supp. 2006). The BPCA provides for additional market exclusivity for drugs protected by patents as well as for other forms of market
exclusivity held by the drug manufacturer (i.e., exclusivity for drugs with new chemical entities, drugs designed to treat rare diseases, and for new uses of approved
drugs). This report uses the term “on-patent” to describe drugs that have patent protection or another form of market exclusivity. This report uses the term “off-patent”
for those drugs whose patent protection or other forms of market exclusivity have expired.
10 21 U.S.C. §355c (b) (1). (West Supp. 2006).
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Pediatric Research Equity Act
The Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003
(PREA)23 had as its purpose the codification of
a federal regulation promulgated in 1998 by the
FDA (known as the “Pediatric Rule”) but subsequently overturned in court as exceeding FDA
authority.24 The 2003 legislation expressly authorizes the agency to do what a court refused
to permit in the case of pediatric drug testing:
require pediatric testing of certain already-marketed drugs and biological products – regardless of their patent status – and to institute a
presumption in favor of express pediatric testing and labeling for new drugs.
With respect to new drugs and biologics, the
PREA requires that a manufacturer submit,
with any New Drug Application (NDA), adequate data to assess the safety and efficacy
of the drug for the claimed indications in all relevant pediatric subpopulations, even if the drug
company has not claimed any specific pediatric
uses.25 In addition, in the case of new drugs and
biologics, the law requires the submission of
data to support dosing and administration information for any pediatric population in which the
manufacturer claims the drug has been found
to be safe and effective.26 These new drug requirements can be waived by the Secretary if a
pharmaceutical company can demonstrate that
(1) necessary studies are impossible or highly
impracticable;27 (2) the evidence strongly suggests the drug would be ineffective or unsafe
in all pediatric groups;28 or (3) the drug is not
thought to represent a meaningful therapeutic
benefit over existing therapies for children.29

Apart from a waiver, PREA also permits the FDA
to grant a deferral to drug manufacturers which
allows the applicant to submit the pediatric assessment after the submission of an NDA.30 A
deferral acknowledges that a pediatric assessment is required, but it delays the submission
of the pediatric study data until a specified date
after approval of the drug. The FDA may grant
a deferral if it finds one or more of the following: (1) the drug is ready for approval for use
in adults before the pediatric studies are complete; or (2) pediatric studies should be delayed
until additional safety or efficacy data have
been collected; or (3) there is another
appropriate reason for deferral. 31 To obtain
a deferral, the drug manufacturer must submit

number of pediatric patients for its labeled
indications, or if there is reason to believe that
t h e d r u g c o u l d r e p r e s e n t a meaningful
therapeutic benefit over existing therapies.34
Both of these scenarios require a finding by the
HHS Secretary that the absence of adequate
l a b e l i n g c o u l d p o s e s i g n i f icant risks to
pediatric patients.35 Even considering its broad
exceptions, the legislation provides a “stick” in
the government’s policy arsenal related to
pediatric health safety.

the reasons a deferral is warranted, a description of the planned studies, and evidence that
the studies will be conducted on time.32

subsequently overturned in court in 2002 as
exceeding FDA authority. The 2003 legislation
expressly authorizes the agency to do what a
court refused to permit in the case of pediatric
drug testing: require pediatric testing of certain new and already-marketed drugs and
biological products – regardless of their patent status – and to institute a presumption in
favor of express pediatric testing and labeling for new drugs.

In practice, drug manufacturers appear to submit with their NDA a request for a deferral of
the pediatric assessment for any of the reasons
stated above. It is possible that at this point the
FDA will grant a deferral and that the deferral is
indefinite (i.e., the study does not take place).
Consistent with this assumption, an FDA draft
guidance on compliance with PREA points out
that the failure to submit a pediatric assessment
will not be the basis for withdrawing approval of
a new drug33 (FDA 2005, 14).
For drugs that are already approved and thus
outside the NDA process, the PREA also gives
the FDA authority to require pediatric data if the
drug is currently being used for a substantial

The Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003
(PREA) had as its purpose the codification of
a federal regulation promulgated in 1998 by
the FDA (known as the “Pediatric Rule”) but

With respect to new drugs and biologics, the
PREA requires that a manufacturer submit,
with any New Drug Application (NDA), adequate data to assess the safety and efficacy
of the drug for the claimed indications in all relevant pediatric subpopulations, even if the drug
company has not claimed any specific pediatric
uses. In addition, in the case of new drugs and
biologics, the law requires the submission of
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21 U.S.C. § 355a (b), (c). (West Supp. 2006).
But, the FDA could still approve generics during this six-month window if the applicant submitted its own research and did not rely on any data from the originator’s
submission. (Milne 1999, 269)
13 21 U.S.C. § 355a (b), (c). (West Supp. 2006).
14 Li et al illustrate the variability of the financial benefits enjoyed by pharmaceutical companies that choose to conduct pediatric clinical trials. See also Government
Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Pediatric Drug Research: Studies Conducted Under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act. March
2007, at p.39.
15 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of USC, however the exclusivity lan
guage remains at 21 U.S.C. § 355a (b), (c) (West Supp. 2006).
16 42 U.S.C. § 284(m).
17 42 U.S.C. § 284(m) (a).
18 42 U.S.C. § 284(m) (b).
19 Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 290b (West Supp. 2006).
20 Id. at § 290b (c) (1).
21 FDA is authorized to make written requests under the following circumstances: (1) based on the availability of information concerning the safe and effective use of the
drug in the pediatric population; (2) whether new pediatric studies concerning the drug will produce health benefits for children; and (3) whether the reformulation of
the drug for pediatric use is necessary. BPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 284m (West Supp. 2006).
12
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data to support dosing and administration information for any pediatric population in which the
manufacturer claims the drug has been found
to be safe and effective. These new drug requirements can be waived by the Secretary if a
pharmaceutical company can demonstrate that
(1) necessary studies are impossible or highly
impracticable; (2) the evidence strongly suggests the drug would be ineffective or unsafe
in all pediatric groups; or (3) the drug is not
thought to represent a meaningful therapeutic
benefit over existing therapies for children.
Apart from a waiver, PREA also permits the
FDA to grant a deferral to drug manufacturers
which allows the applicant to submit the pediatric assessment after the submission of an
NDA. A deferral acknowledges that a pediatric
assessment is required, but it delays the submission of the pediatric study data until a specified date after approval of the drug. The FDA
may grant a deferral if it finds one or more of
the following: (1) the drug is ready for approval
for use in adults before the pediatric studies
are complete; or (2) pediatric studies should be
delayed until additional safety or efficacy data

have been collected; or (3) there is another appropriate reason for deferral. To obtain a deferral, the drug manufacturer must submit the
reasons a deferral is warranted, a description
of the planned studies, and evidence that the
studies will be conducted on time.
In practice, drug manufacturers appear to submit with their NDA a request for a deferral of
the pediatric assessment for any of the reasons
stated above. It is possible that at this point, the
FDA will grant a deferral and that the deferral
could be for an indefinite time period, although
no systematic study has ever been made of the
extent to which deferrals do in fact become permanent. Consistent with this assumption, an
FDA draft guidance on compliance with PREA
points out that the failure to submit a pediatric
assessment will not be the basis for withdrawing approval of a new drug (FDA 2005, 14).
For drugs that are already approved and thus
outside the NDA process, the PREA also gives
the FDA authority to require pediatric data if the
drug is currently being used for a substantial
number of pediatric patients for its labeled indi-

cations, or if there is reason to believe that the
drug could represent a meaningful therapeutic
benefit over existing therapies. Both of these
scenarios require a finding by the HHS Secretary that the absence of adequate labeling could
pose significant risks to pediatric patients. Even
considering its broad exceptions, the legislation
provides a “stick” in the government’s policy arsenal related to pediatric health safety. To date,
however, this provision has not been used.
While there are little public data regarding the
FDA’s use of PREA to require pediatric drug
studies, following the promulgation of the Pediatric Rule that ultimately was struck down,
the FDA instituted a series of actions. Out of a
total of 517 new drug applications submitted to
the FDA during the 1999-2002 time period, the
agency issued 264 waivers and 206 deferrals.
Ultimately, 129 applications resulted in completed pediatric studies, 67 of which were not
associated with pediatric exclusivity. In other
words, the Pediatric Rule generated additional
pediatric studies (FDA 2003 and Politis 2005,
271, 288). Moreover, the government’s use of
PREA has resulted in 55 label changes.

Table 1: Pediatric Rule Update
April 1999 - December 2002 (FDA 2005)
Total # of
Applications

Waivers

Full Waivers

Partial
Waivers

Apr 1999 –
Mar 2002

404

195

130

65

172

94

52

Apr – Dec
2002

113

69

34

35

34

35

15

Total

517

264

164

100

206

129

67

22
23

Applications Applications
with
with
Deferred Stud- Completed
ies
Studies

Applications
with
Completed
Studies not
Associated
with
Pediatric
Exclusivity

42 U.S.C. § 284m (West Supp. 2006).
42 U.S.C. § 290b (West Supp. 2006).
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The Current Policy Landscape
The pediatric exclusivity reauthorization debate
is unfolding in a shifting policy landscape. Part
of this landscape, as noted, is a possible growing resistance to off-label prescribing among
insurers. Another aspect of this changing policy
landscape is the Medicare Modernization Act
of 2003, which has resulted in an enormous
expansion of direct federal involvement in financing prescription drugs and biologicals for
Medicare beneficiaries, thereby raising federal
budgetary implications for reauthorization. In
addition, the continued growth of federal and
state prescription drug expenditures under
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP) underscores the financial
aspects of exclusivity. Thus, while the evidence
suggests value in reauthorizing the BPCA, significant concerns have been raised over the cost to
both the federal government and consumers regarding the length of time (currently 6 months) of
the market exclusivity extension.

Thus, it becomes increasingly important to understand the nature of the contribution made
by pediatric exclusivity, particularly since PREA
itself grants the FDA considerable regulatory
power to require testing. Although evidence
suggests that patent exclusivity can create a
strong incentive to conduct requested safety
studies (Li et al. 2007), the extent to which
policy makers can rely on incentives alone as a
means of ensuring appropriate testing remains
unclear. Evidence suggests that in certain instances, a six-month extension of the patent
exclusivity can be highly profitable for certain
drugs while in other instances, the incentive
does not yield any economic benefit for the
drug. One study that presented a detailed comparison of the cost of pediatric trials in relation
to the economic return of exclusivity reported
a median cost per written request of $12.34
million and a median economic benefit of $134
million (Li et al. 2007).

In sum, although the direct federal cost associated with pediatric drug testing may have
increased, countervailing considerations, if
anything, point toward greater investment in
expanded safety testing in children. Thus, it is
essential to understand the value of the federal
financial investment that a pediatric exclusivity policy represents. This financial investment
comes in the form of higher outlays under federal
health care programs when lower cost competitors experience delayed entry into the market.
And of course this investment does not reflect
the broader governmental and social costs incurred by private payers, particularly those administering employer-sponsored health plans
that are themselves heavily tax subsidized.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this analysis was twofold: first,
to examine the available evidence regarding
the impact and efficacy of pediatric exclusivity
in the years following the enactment of pediat-

ric exclusivity in 1997 and its 2002 legislative
reauthorization; second, to determine whether
it is possible to develop preliminary estimates
of cost savings that might be achieved from a

pediatric exclusivity incentive, thereby balancing the cost of governmental investment.

analyzed the peer-reviewed literature on the
overall health impact of pediatric clinical trials. A literature search was performed using
PubMed, Medline and Cochrane databases.
Various combinations of the following keywords
were used: pediatric clinical trials, pediatric
pharmaceutical interventions, pediatric drug
therapy, public health, health benefits, health

impact, as well as the individual drug names
that have been tested under the pediatric exclusivity provision. We excluded studies that
presented the results of individual clinical trials
of drugs that were not tested under the pediatric exclusivity provision.

Review of the literature
Using standard literature review techniques, researchers sought evidence of pediatric clinical
drug trials from both formally published studies, as well as data published by the FDA on
its website regarding the 132 drugs that have
been granted exclusivity extensions under the
pediatric exclusivity provision. In addition to
reviewing evidence from the FDA website, we

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Pediatric Research Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
See Ass’n Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp.2d 204, 212 (D.DC. 2002).
FDCA § 505B, 21 U.S.C. §355c(a)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2006). These data do not need to come from pediatric trials exclusively, but can be extrapolated from adult
studies when possible.
FDCA § 505B, 21 U.S.C. §355c(a)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2006).
21 U.S.C. §355c(a)(4)(A).
Id.
Id.
21 U.S.C. §355c(a)(3).
Id.
Id.
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Estimates of potential cost savings
In our analysis we have attempted to compute
the potential savings that may accrue from
improved pediatric labeling resulting from pediatric drug trials undertaken in response to
the pediatric exclusivity incentive. Our main
interest in assessing potential cost savings for
consumers, insurers, patients and others that
can be attributed to improved pediatric testing and labeling grows out of the survey of the
literature described above, although previous
research and analysis has been scant at best.
A 2001 report from the FDA (FDA 2001) concluded that improved pediatric labeling would
lead to savings of $228 million annually as a
result of reduction in hospital costs associated
with five major diagnoses: asthma, HIV/AIDS,
cancer, pneumonia, and kidney infection. This
estimate however, was based on somewhat
arbitrary assumptions (see below). While all
such analyses, including our own require such
assumptions, we opted to base our own conclusions on research findings reported in the
general literature.
Relying on a relatively broad body of literature
on adherence and non-compliance with medications, our analysis is founded on an assump-

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

tion that improved drug labeling will improve
compliance by children, and our approach has
been to map the relationship between improved
compliance and reduced costs associated with
hospital and medical care and other financial
burdens of illness in children. For this cost estimate, we rely on published studies and thus
limit the number of conditions to be examined;
however, unlike the previous FDA study, we
are able to use assumptions based on previous analyses, rather than invoke more arbitrary
rules of thumb (in its 2001 study, the FDA arrived at its estimate using the assumption that
25% of the excess incidence of hospitalizations
for children versus adults could be eliminated
due to improved labeling).
Another analysis that has some relevance to
the policy question posed was performed by
Sokol et al (Sokol et al. 2005). Using data from
a large insurance plan, the authors estimated
the relationship between medication adherence
and outcomes for four major medical conditions: diabetes, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and CHF. They found that an increase
in compliance from a “medium” compliance
range to a “high” range resulted in declines in

the risk of hospitalization ranging from 48% to
12%. However, when the authors considered
the impact of compliance on direct net medical costs (outpatient and inpatient costs, minus
drug costs), the findings were mixed: the increase compliance resulted in cost reductions
for diabetes and hypertension (30% and 8%
respectively), no significant change for hypercholesterolemia, and a 12% increase in costs
associated with CHF. Even though one out of
every five subjects in the Sokol sample were
aged 0-18, it was not possible to extrapolate
the effects for any specific age group from published tables. Based on our extensive search of
the literature, no study similar to that performed
by Sokol - linking compliance directly with
medical costs specific to children - has been
published to date. However, it was possible to
extrapolate for the pediatric population using a
combination of results to address this limitation,
as explained below.

The FDA’s Draft Guidance (FDA 2005) clarifies that failure to submit a pediatric assessment could instigate an FDA injunction or seizure proceeding if the drug is
found to be misbranded for lack of pediatric data. Since the guidance has not been issued as a rule and is still in draft, this outcome is unlikely.
21 U.S.C. §355c(b)(1).
Id.
http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/Prea_label_post-mar_2_mtg.htm
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
The Congressional Budget Office has recently estimated the impact of the modified extension of pediatric exclusivity contained in the Senate’s reform measure at
$150 million over 10 years due to the delay of market entry by generic competitors.
http://www.fda.gov
Compliance was measured using the medical possession ratio (MPR = prescription days filled/number days in prescription period).
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FINDINGS
1. A decade of pediatric drug safety testing shows the importance of an active pediatric drug 		
safety policy
The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
recently studied the impact of the BPCA on pediatric trials and labeling changes. The report

illustrates the relationship between legislative
policy and improvements in pediatric drug testing. It also highlights the difficulty in conducting

pediatric trials if the drug sponsor declines to
do so. Table 2 summarizes this information.

Table 2: Drug Safety Testing Under BPCA (2002-2005)

214

173

41

9

Total number
of written
requests
issued for
studies of
on-patent
drugs

Total number
of studies
agreed to by
drug sponsor
as a result of
a written
request

Total number
of written
requests
declined by
drug sponsor

Total declined
studies
referred to
FNIH

0
Total FNIH
funded
studies

59

55

52

45

Total number
of studies
completed
by December,
2005

Total number
of exclusivity
determinations
made by
December,
2005

Total number
of studies in
which drug
was granted
exclusivity

Total number
of pediatric
labeling changes
involving drugs
with exclusivity
protection

Highlights of findings from the literature:

•

Under the BPCA, when drug sponsor declines a written request for pediatric study, the FDA may refer the drug to the FNIH for further study.
Since the BPCA’s inception, however, only 9 of the 41 declined studies (22%) have been referred. According to NIH estimates, the cost of
these pediatric trials exceeds $43 million. Cost and a lack of funding meant that as of December 2005, none of the referred drugs had
undergone study.

•

The drugs, for which written study requests were issued address a variety of conditions. The severity of these conditions varies greatly, from
simple conditions such as headaches to more severe conditions such as leukemia, chronic pain management, weight loss, diabetes,
rheumatoid arthritis and the treatment of HIV.

9

•

Of the 52 drugs granted pediatric exclusivity, 45 (87 percent) were later subject to one or more labeling changes. Of these 45, one-third
had alterations to the age limits for use;39 two-thirds had changes to adverse event information; recommended dosages were modified in
forty percent; and almost 30 percent had amendments to safety and efficacy indicators.

•

•

In nearly one quarter, labeling changes included a determination that the drug had not been proven safe or efficacious for pediatric use
(thereby requiring further pediatric studies); seventeen percent were not recommended for pediatric use and seven percent had changes
to contraindication information. One drug was completely withdrawn from the market and 2 showed results that were not significantly
different from placebos.
Of the 52 drugs granted pediatric exclusivity, 19 percent involved one label change, 25 percent involved 2 label changes, 33 percent
involved 3 label changes and 10 percent involved 4 label changes. None involved more than four label changes.

The literature on pediatric drug testing confirms the importance of an improved pediatric
testing policy. Adams et al (Adams et al. 2001,
706) found that use of cromolyn significantly
decreased the risk for hospitalization and
emergency department visits for children with
asthma. Whalley et al (Whalley et al. 2002,
1133) found that use of pimecrolimus to treat
pediatric atopic dermatitis was associated with
a significant increase in the quality life of caregivers. Gillman et al (Gillman et al. 2002, 687)
found that the use of cetirizine to treat pediatric
seasonal allergic rhinitis was associated with a
significant increase in the health-related quality
of life (physical, psychological, and social functioning and well-being) of the patient.
No studies were found that addressed the
health impact of pediatric clinical trials in general since enactment of the pediatric safety law.
However, we did find two relevant articles on the

specific impact of pediatric cancer clinical trials.
Both Pratt (Pratt 1996, 169-172) and Caldwell
et al (Caldwell et al. 2004, 808) address the
significant advances made in childhood cancer
survival rates and attribute this success to the
large number and highly coordinated nature of
pediatric cancer clinical trials. Cancer is one of
the leading causes of death in children, second
only to accidents for children over one year of
age (Pratt 1996, 169). The reasons for testing
cancer drugs specifically in children include: 1)
cancers may present, progress and respond to
treatment differently in children than in adults;
and 2) toxicity levels and tolerance of treatment
agents may also differ (Pratt 1996, 170).
Because of the compelling nature of cancer,
almost all pediatric cancer patients in the U.S.
are treated by physicians or institutions participating in the Children’s Cancer Group or Pediatric Oncology Group, each of which conducts

national and international pediatric clinical trials
(Pratt 1996, 170). This allows for substantial
coordination and information sharing regarding the results of clinical trials and the resulting
revisions to treatment protocols. The positive
health impact of the large number and coordinated nature of pediatric cancer clinical trials in
the US is undisputed: survival rates for some
pediatric cancers, both in the US and internationally, have increased dramatically over the
last 40 years. For example, the survival rate
of acute lymphoblastic leukemia increased
from 5% in 1960 to over 70% in 1996 (Pratt
1996, 169). The experience of pediatric cancer
clinical trials in the US confirms the long-term
health benefits of pediatric clinical trials. In light
of this success, study authors report that “pediatric cancer trials offer a paradigm for pediatric
clinical research” (Caldwell et al. 2004, 808).

2. Adherence to more appropriate drug regimens – a possible outcome of greater testing – would be
associated with both improved health outcomes and lower pediatric health care costs
Few would disagree that increased pediatric
testing and the resulting improvements in labeling should improve the quality of pediatric
health care. Improved labeling may be expected to reduce inappropriate drug utilization, by
identifying those circumstances in which the
use of a particular drug is contraindicated in
children or requires a previously unanticipated
dose adjustment. Improved labeling should

42 Age

also increase appropriate utilization of a particular drug therapy in situations in which testing
prompts labeling changes that identify safe and
efficacious use of drugs previously underutilized in pediatric populations.
Taken together these changes should contribute to improved standards of care, provided of
course that they are adequately promulgated to

prescribers, and that prescribers modify their
prescribing patterns accordingly. Significantly,
we were unable to identify any literature that
directly reported changes in prescriber behavior arising from labeling changes, and we found
a similar lack of substantive, peer-reviewed
literature on the effects of pediatric testing on
health care costs associated with inappropriate
drug use.

limit means either the approved ages were extended or they were shortened (i.e. was 12-18 years now 3-18 years or was 3-18 years now 12-18 years old.
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Thus in order to model the impact of improved
labeling on health care costs, we elected to use
the impact of changes in patient compliance
as a proxy for the effects of both reductions
in inappropriate use of medication in children
and increases in appropriate use. In this way
we were able to estimate the associated health
care cost savings arising from better health
outcomes. In addition, given that inappropriate
drug use often results in adverse drug reactions, we were also able to calculate the costs
of hospitalizations resulting from adverse drug
reactions, a cost that may be expected to be
reduced to a significant extent with improved
drug labeling.
While it is acknowledged that the assumptions
made at each step introduce an additional level

of uncertainty in these estimates, the analysis
is inherently conservative in that it assumes
that more appropriate labeling will have an effect similar to a modest improvement in compliance. Moreover the analysis is limited to
assessing the impact only in the treatment of
asthma. While the most common chronic illness
affecting children (6.2 million or 9% of children
according to a recent GAO report), asthma is
only one of several conditions for which inappropriate prescribing may be expected to contribute to unnecessary hospitalizations (GAO
2007). Asthma is the leading cause of hospitalization for children between 1 and 17 years old,
according to a recent report from the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
(AHRQ 2005). In 2002 alone, AHRQ reported
128,000 asthma-related hospitalizations among

children, with a mean charge of $10,400 for an
asthma-related hospitalization. Noncompliance
with clinical guidelines for asthma therapy results in a significant increase in the risk of an
asthma-related hospitalization among affected
children (Bauman et al. 2002). Therefore, an
increase in compliance with clinical guidelines
should substantially reduce the number of hospital admissions for asthmatic children, thereby
generating significant cost savings.

The methodology below was employed to estimate the savings that would result from an increase in compliance with clinical guidelines:
Hospital costs associated with a pediatric compliance group =
P1 * P2 * P3 * N * C

Where P1 = % in the compliance group (low, medium or high)
		
P2 = % risk of hospitalization in that compliance group
		
P3 = % risk of hospitalization for the population40
		
N = number of asthmatic children in the population (ages 1-17)
		
C = average hospital charge for asthmatic children (ages 1-17)41

The next step was to calculate changes in costs
resulting from a shift of the low compliance
group to medium compliance, and from a shift of
medium compliance group to high compliance.
In addition, we relied on past studies to obtain
aggregate estimates of direct medical costs

other than hospitalizations, as well as indirect
costs due to childhood asthma (Weiss et al.
2001, 5). For non-hospital costs we assumed
that non-compliance would result in similar effects as in hospital costs. Thus, we acknowledge the relatively imprecise nature of the estimates for the non-hospital component; for this

our estimates should be taken only as a reflection of relative order of magnitude.

43 P3

needs to be included because the estimates for P1 and P2 from Bauman et al (Bauman et al. 2002) pertain to children likely to be hospitalized (conditional
probability).
44 We used data on all hospitalization costs for the U.S. population and children, and the age distribution hospitalized patients to extrapolate the average cost of a pedi
atric asthma-related hospitalization. In 2002 there were 128,000 pediatric asthma-related hospitalization and 404,483 total asthma-related hospitalizations.
45 Further detail on methods and values are available from a technical appendix upon request.
46 To adjust for inflation, we trended forward estimate reported in Weiss et al (Weiss et al. 2001, 5) for 1994 and 1998 using the medical component of CPI.
47 Level of caregiver compliance was ranked on the following scale: high (no admission of noncompliance), medium (1 instance of noncompliance admitted), and low
(>1 instance of noncompliance admitted).
48 Calculation : Annual cost of ADR-caused pediatric hospitalizations for kids 1-17 years old
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Other Medical Costs

Hospital costs
The most recent year for which relevant hospitalization cost data were available was 2002.
Dollar amounts for hospital and other medical
care were trended forward to 2005 using the
medical component of the consumer price index (CPI). The value of lost productivity was
trended forward using the overall CPI. Results
are given below.

resulted in an 11% decline in asthma-related
hospital costs for children (ages 0-17). In dollar terms this reduction amounts to $96 million
in 2005 dollars. Of this, about $32 million would
result from increasing compliance of low compliers, while $62 million would be associated
with increasing ‘medium’ or partial compliance
to full compliance.

Using a similar approach we estimate that increasing compliance would result in total asthma-related healthcare cost savings of 11% of
the total cost of non-hospital asthma-related
healthcare (excluding drug costs) for children in
2002, or about $107 million (in 2005 dollars).

Our analysis indicates that increasing compliance with prescribed medications would have

Value of Caregiver Lost Productivity

Cost Savings from Reductions in Adverse Drug Reactions (ADRs)

A previous study reported that pediatric asth-

ADRs resulting from inappropriate use of medi-

costs for newborns and children under one year

ma results in about 11.8 million missed school
days. It was further estimated that, on average,
this resulted in loss of caregiver productivity
valued at $108 per day (2005 dollars) (Weiss et
al. 2000, 495). Assuming that increased compliance (in the same manner as described in
our Methodology section) would have the same
impact on the incidence of school days lost as
on the incidence of hospitalizations, we calculated that an additional $16 million dollars could
be saved.

cation are another potential source of morbidity and result in higher health care costs that
should be reduced with improved drug labeling.
It has been estimated that 2% of all pediatric
hospital admissions are prompted by adverse
drug reactions (i.e. asthma and others but excluding cancer-related ADRs and NICU admissions) (Mitchell et al. 1988, 24). Using national
data, this implies that eliminating ADRs for children ages 1-17 could have potentially resulted
in overall savings of $290 million. (Note that

of age are excluded since they are greatly susceptible to outlier costs.) Since hospitalization
from ADRs cannot be fully corrected through
better labeling (some ADR-related hospitalizations arise from other causes), this figure represents the strongest possible effect, since the
literature does not allow for adjustment of ADRrelated hospitalizations to reflect other causes.

medical and school related lost productivity) we
arrived at an annual total of about $225 million.
Note that we calculated similar savings for several other major pediatric medical conditions,
but with only partial data available from past
studies. As a result these estimates required
stronger assumptions. While we cannot be
certain that improved labeling would fully in-

duce all of the behavioral changes by consumers and providers needed to achieve all of the
above cost savings, we note that our estimates
should be taken as a lower bound, since they
are based on rather conservative assumptions,
(e.g. lowest compliance would not be raised to
full compliance, productivity losses due only
to lost school days); therefore, our estimates

Asthma, All Sources
Given that asthma accounts for 1.82% of all
hospital costs for children (AHRQ 2003), from
the above we further calculated that about
$5.29 million in ADR-related savings in hospital costs may be attributable to asthma alone.
Adding this to the previous components of cost
savings associated with improved compliance
and reduction in ADRs (hospital care, other

= # pediatric hospitalizations (1-17yo) x % caused by ADRs x avg cost per hospitalizations
= $ 256,650,000 in 2002 dollars = $ 290,438,655.46 in 2005 dollars
Note however that this assumes full effect in reducing ADRs due to appropriate labeling. Values for the formula above were obtained information as follows: In 2002,
there were 1.711 million hospital discharges for children 1-17 (AHRQ 2005, 12); In 2003, the average total charge for all pediatric hospitalizations was $7,500. (AHRQ
2003, 35)
49 It is acknowledged that there may be some overlap in ADR-related savings in hospital costs and those attributable to improved compliance as calculated in the
previous section. However since the magnitude of ADR-related savings is small compared to the potential savings achievable through improved compliance, and the
estimates of savings due to fewer ADRs are conservative, the impact of this potential “double counting” is likely to be small.
50 Using similar methodology we calculated the hospitalization cost savings that would result from increasing compliance with medical regimens for additional conditions
for which incidence and cost of hospitalization for the pediatric population were available from the literature. This yielded cost savings resulting from increased com
pliance $53,649,046., $45,016,973., $48,756,239.36 (in 2005 dollars) for hospitalizations associated with pediatric pneumonia, pediatric affective or mood disorder,
and pediatric epilepsy/convulsions respectively. Note However, that corresponding information for pediatric noncompliance could not be found for these conditions as
had been the case for pediatric asthma; this required us to make an ad hoc assumption that the increased compliance for these medical conditions would result in
the same percent hospitalization cost savings as the 11% hospitalization cost savings that was reported for pediatric asthma.
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should be taken as a lower bound, suggesting
the full level of savings is attainable through
simple policy intervention. Moreover the cost

reductions we find for only one major medical
condition, asthma (albeit from several sources)
approximate the total savings in hospital costs

the FDA found for five medical conditions, suggesting a greater benefit from labeling than previously thought.

sions, with an additional $26 million incurred by
states over a similar period (CBO 2007). While
comparing these costs with our estimates of
benefits above ($220 due to pediatric asthma
compliance, and $290 million due to reduced
ADRs for most conditions, annually) is to some
extent an “apple and oranges” comparison, the

orders of magnitude suggest that efforts to improve pediatric labeling may be cost effective
from a societal perspective, even with market
exclusivity arrangements such as those under
the BPCA.

Social Benefits and Social Costs
Averted costs (savings) due to better compliance or reduced ADRs represent the potential
benefits of pediatric labeling. Preliminary estimates suggest a total cost (in additional drug
purchases) to the Federal government of $150
million from 2008 to 2017 due to delayed generic entry under marketing exclusivity provi-

Table 3: Potential Annual Savings Due to Improved Pediatric Labeling (Asthma, Ages 1-17)

Source of Potential Savings:

All Sources:

48

Data Sources49

Potential Annual Savings in
millions (2005 Dollars)
$224.3

Improved Compliance:
Hospitalization Costs

$96

Bauman et al, 2002; AHRQ Fact Book, 2003
and 2005; American Lung Association Fact
Sheet, 2006

Other Medical Costs

$107

Piecoro et al, 2001

$16

Bauman et al, 2002;
Weiss et al, 2000

$5.3

Mitchell et al, 1988; AHRQ Fact Book,
2003 and 2005

Averted Caretaker
productivity loss
Averted ADR:

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Although the direct federal cost associated
with pediatric drug testing may have increased,
countervailing considerations, if anything, point
toward the need for expanded safety testing.
Not only does broader testing respond to the
growing demand for evidence-based care, but
it also contributes to the growing focus on patient safety. To the extent that better testing ultimately leads to more cost-effective treatments

and therapies – through the substitution of less
costly drug regimens for higher-cost and avoidable medical and institutional care – promoting
a culture of safety ultimately is considered cost
effective as well.
Perhaps the single most important factor that
militates in the direction of greater emphasis on
pediatric testing is the growing focus on patient

safety and medical error reduction as equally
fundamental aspects of a national health quality
policy. Achieving such basic reforms may entail
societal investment in the research and studies
that shed light on safe practices for the population as a whole, as well as sub-populations
such as children, who are deemed particularly
vulnerable to error and adverse events.

51

We wish to note an important caveat: the methods from the CBO Cost Estimate (CBO 2007) were not provided. Therefore these estimates remain to be verified.
summary of these calculations is given in the body of the report.
53 These references are the sources of the variables that were used to calculate the potential cost savings due to improved pediatric labeling. For complete references,
please see attached bibliography.
54 A recent New Yorker article focused on mental illness in children illustrates the degree of risk that can arise when children with serious mental health conditions are
treated through inadequately tested prescription drug regimens combining multiple drugs over a prolonged time period. (Groopman 2007, 28-34).
52 A
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In sum, improving pediatric drug safety policy
is a compelling goal that justifies strong governmental investment. How this investment is
made – through greater direct government investment in testing, greater regulation of testing by the pharmaceutical industry, incentivization of industry testing, or a combination of the
three approaches – is a far broader question
and one that transcends this specific analysis.
This analysis does suggest that if adherence to
appropriate drug regimens is viewed as a possible, downstream outcome of better testing,
then incentives can be associated with important results in terms of both health outcomes
and health care costs. Thus, incentivization,
along with other policy interventions, can be
viewed as one of an arsenal of policy levers
whose aim is to improve the safety and quality
of pediatric care.
Several observations are also worth noting.
First, in view of what would appear to be a generous incentive, BPCA should be modified to
create a more robust standard for testing. In our
view, this more robust approach is warranted
despite the existence of the government’s direct
regulatory authority over testing under PREA,

since the government tends to use its authority
only to a limited degree. As a result, lawmakers
might consider strengthening BPCA’s incentivization approach by requiring manufacturers
who elect not to undertake a requested test to
submit clear and convincing evidence that pediatric testing would result in a direct and net
loss to the manufacturer in comparison to the
long term value of the incentive. Since pediatric
exclusivity effectively means that government is
paying companies – through higher drug pricing – to study the effects of drugs in children,
the payment should result in a presumption of
testing in our opinion in the absence of strong
evidence that such an incentive in fact does
not exist in particular cases. In some cases, incentives may be lucrative, while in others, they
may be modest. But the fact that some cases of
exclusivity are less profitable should not dimin-

from a purely economic vantage point, it would
be less expensive and more reliable for the
government to simply underwrite the cost of pediatric drug testing and to move toward a policy
in which tests that are believed to be necessary
by the government’s chief scientific body simply are performed. Indeed, in our opinion there
is much to be learned about the government’s
use of its regulatory authority under PREA. Under what circumstances has the government
used its PREA powers and with what results?
What has been the health outcomes record
in the case of pediatric use of drugs for which
studies were recommended but indefinitely
deferred? These questions all compel further
research in the quest for an effective pediatric
drug safety policy.

ish the net value of the incentive. The key issue
is the safety of drug use in children.
Second, this study does not compare government expenditures through incentives to the
cost of alternative government approaches to
pediatric drug testing through regulation and
direct investment in testing. It may well be that

The authors wish to express their appreciation to Leona Cuttler, M.D., Professor of Pediatrics and Bioethics, and Director of the Rainbow Center
for Child Health Policy, Rainbow Babies and Children’s Hospital, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland Ohio, who lent her expertise and
thoughtful comments to this analysis.

14

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Robert, Anne Fuhlbrigge, Jonathan Finkelstein, Paula Lozano, James Livingston, Kevin Weiss and Scott Weiss. 2001. Impact of Inhaled
Antiinflammatory Therapy on Hospitalization and Emergency Department Visits for Children With Asthma. Pediatrics 107, no. 4: 706-711.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 2003. AHRQ Fact Book: Care of Children and Adolescents in U.S. Hospitals.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 2005. AHRQ Fact Book: Hospitalization in the United States, 2002.
American Lung Association. Asthma & Children Fact Sheet, August 2006. American Lung Association. http://www.lungusa.org/site/pp.asp?c=dvLU
K9O0E&b=44352.
Bauman, Laurie, Elizabeth Wright, Frederick Leickly, Ellen Crain, Deanna Kruszon-Moran, Shari Wade and Cynthia Visness. 2002. Pediatrics 110,
no. 1: 6-12.
Breslow, Lauren. 2003. The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002: The Rise of the Voluntary Incentive Structure and Congressional
Refusal to Require Pediatric Testing. Harvard Journal on Legislation 40: 133-192.
Budetti, Peter. 2003. Ensuring Safe and Effective Medications for Children. Journal of the American Medical Association 290, no. 7: 950-51.
Caldwell, Patrina, Sharon Murphy, Phyllis Butow and Jonathon Craig. 2004. Clinical Trials in Children. The Lancet 364, no. 9436: 803-811.
Congressional Budget Office. Cost Estimate: S. 1082 Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of 2007. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget
Office: April 27, 2007.
Eiland, Lea, and Patrice Knight. 2006. Evaluating the off-label use of medications in children. American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy 63,
no.11: 1062-65.
Food and Drug Administration. 2001. The Pediatric Exclusivity Provision: January 2001 Status Report to Congress FDA Draft Guidance: How to
Comply with the Pediatric Research Equity Act
Food and Drug Administration. 2003. Pediatric Rule Update. Food and Drug Administration. http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/rulestats.htm.
Food and Drug Administration. 2005. FDA Draft Guidance: How to Comply with the Pediatric Research Equity Act.
Gillman, Sherwin, Mark Blatter, John Condemi, Millicent Collins, Abayomi Olufade, Nancy Kline Leidy, Douglass Chapman and Benjamin Kramer.
2002. The Health-Related Quality of Life Effects of Once-Daily Cetirizine HCl Syrup in Children with Seasonal Allergic Rhinitis. Clinical Pediatrics
41, no. 9: 687-696.
Gostin, Lawrence. 2000. Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press and Milbank Memorial Fund.
Government Accountability Office. 2007. Pediatric Drug Research: Studies Conducted Under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act.
Groopman, Jerome. 2007. What’s Normal? The New Yorker, April 9.
Iyasu, Solomon and M. Dianne Murphy, 2007 “Pharmacovigilance in Pediatrics.” In Pharmacovigilance, ed. Ronald D. Mann and Elizabeth B.
Andrews, 497-506. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons.
Li, Jennifer, Eric Eisenstein, Henry Grabowski, Elizabeth Reid, Barry Mangum, Kevin Schulman, John Goldsmith, M. Dianne Murphy, Robert Califf
and Daniel Benjamin Jr. 2007. Economic Return of Clinical Trials Performed Under the Pediatric Exclusivity Program. Journal of the American
Medical Association 297, no. 5: 480-488.
Lynch, Holly. 2007. Give them what they want? The Permissibility of Pediatric Placebo-Controlled Trials Under the Best Pharmaceuticals for
Children Act. Annals of Health Law 16, no. 1: 79.
Meadows, Michelle. 2003. Drug research and children. FDA Consumer magazine, 37 no.1: 12-17.

15

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Milne, Allen, Christopher-Paul. 1999. Pediatric Research: Coming of Age in the New Millennium. American Journal of Therapeutics 6, no. 5: 263.
Mitchell, Allen, Peter Lacouture, Jane Sheehan, Ralph Kauffman and Samuel Shapiro. 1988. Adverse Drug Reactions in Children Leading to
Hospital Admission. Pediatrics 82, no. 1: 24-29.
Piecoro, Lance, Matthew Potoski, Jeff Talbert and Dennis Doherty. 2001. Asthma Prevalence, Cost, and Adherence with Expert Guidelines on the
Utilization of Health Care Services and Costs in a State Medicaid Population. Health Services Research 36, no. 2: 357-371.
Politis, Pamela. 2005. Transition from the carrot to the stick: the evolution of pharmaceutical regulations concerning pediatric drug testing. Widener
Law Review 12, no. 1: 271, 288.
Pratt, Charles. 1996. Pediatric Clinical Trials. The Oncologist 1, no. 3: 169-172.
Schneider, Andy. Tennessee’s New “Medically Necessary” Standard: Uncovering the Insured? Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Tennessee-s-New-Medically-Necessary-Standard-Uncovering-the-Insured-Policy-Brief.pdf.
Shah, Samir, Matthew Hall, Denise Goodman, Pamela Feuer, Vidya Sharma, Crayton Fargason, Daniel Hyman, Kathy Jenkins, Marjorie White,
Fiona Levy, James Levin, David Bertoch and Anthony Slonim. 2007. Off-label Drug Use in Hospitalized Children. Archives of Pediatrics and
Adolescent Medicine 161, no. 3: 282-290.
Sokol, Michael, Kimberly McGuigan, Robert Verbrugge and Robert Epstein. 2005. Impact of Medication Adherence on Hospitalization Risk and
Healthcare Cost. Medical Care 43, no. 6: 521-530.
Weiss, Kevin and Sean Sullivan. 2001. The health economics of asthma and rhinitis. I. Assessing the economic impact. Journal of Allergy and
Clinical Immunology 107, no. 1: 3-8.
Weiss, Kevin, Sean Sullivan and Christopher Lyttle. 2000. Trends in the cost of illness for asthma in the United States, 1985-1994. Journal of
Allergy and Clinical Immunology 106, no. 3: 493-499.
Whalley, Diane, Jasper Huels, Stephen McKenna and Daniel van Assche. 2002. The Benefit of Pimecrolimus on Parents’ Quality of Life in the
Treatment of Pediatric Atopic Dermatitis. Pediatrics 110, no. 6: 1133-1136.

16

